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Sammendrag 
Vi har gjort en modellbasert analyse av hvordan ulike petroleumspriser og ressursmengder kan 
kommet til å påvirke framtidige investeringer og produksjon i arktiske regioner fram til 2050. I vår 
referansebane vil oljeproduksjonen i Arktis dobles over de neste 40 årene. Årsaken er først og fremst 
økt produksjon på Grønland og i Alaska, og til en viss grad i Arktisk Russland. I vår referansebane vil 
arktisk gassproduksjon falle fram til 2035, før den tar seg opp til et nivå i 2050 som er marginalt lavere 
enn dagens. Nedgangen i gasstilbudet de første to tiårene har sammenheng med lavere produksjon i 
Arktisk Russland, mens den senere økningen skyldes økt produksjon i alle arktiske regioner, først og 
fremst Arktisk Russland og Grønland, og til en viss grad Arktisk Canada. Våre resultater er basert på 
lønnsomhetskrqav  og at olje- og gasselskapene har full tilgang til alle arktiske områder med 
petroleumsressurser, dvs. det forutsettes ingen politiske eller miljømessige barrierer.  
 
Ved en lavere oljepris får vi den samme relative nedgangen i produksjonen i alle områder, bortsett fra 
Grønland og østlige deler av Arktisk Russland som påvirkes relativt mer, fordi størstedelen av deres 
produksjon skjer i perioden 2030-50, når oljeprisen er på sitt høysete nivå i referansebanen. I tillegg 
har Øst Arktisk Russland og Grønland de høyeste kostnadene og blir mest rammet av lavere oljepris. 
Ved en økning i oljeprisen fra referansebanen får vi de samme resultatene, men med motsatt fortegn.  
 
Dersom olje- og gasselskapene bare får tilgang til halvparten av de uoppdagede ressursene, vil den 
fremtidige produksjonen i alle Arktiske regioner reduseres relativt mye, bortsett fra Russland der en 
stor del av olje- og gassproduksjonen før 2050 vil komme fra allerede påviste reserver. Fordi Arktisk 
Russland er en betydelig petroleumsprodusent, vil effekten på total arktisk oljeproduksjon være 
moderat og for gass vil den være marginal. Det må likevel påpekes at for den enkelte olje- og 
gassprodusent utenfor Russland kan begrenset tilgang til ressursene føre til relativt store tap i 
fremtidige inntekter.  
 
Mens om lag 10 prosent av den globale oljeproduksjonen i 2010 kommer fra Arktis er andelen for gass 
22 prosent. Selv om rundt 70 prosent av de uoppdagede petroleumsressursene er gass, viser våre 
resultater at den arktiske andelen av verdens gassproduksjon vil falle fram mot 2050. Årsaken er at det 
finnes rimelige og store reserver i andre regioner, spesielt i Qatar og Iran. Våre resultater viser at 
Arktis vil øke sin relative betydning som oljeprodusent utenfor OPEC. Den relative betydningen til 
Arktis som global oljeprodusent kan vedvare dersom oljeprisen holder seg noenlunde høy og 
produsentene får tilgang til en relativt stor del av ressursene, først og fremst i Alaska og på Grønland.  
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1. Introduction 
The Arctic is one of the world’s most important petroleum provinces. Obviously, the petroleum 
resources are important to the arctic countries and regions as sources of income and resource rent 
(Glomsrød and Aslaksen ed., 2009). But the importance of arctic petroleum goes beyond the regional 
and national economies. Large net-importers of petroleum like the US and the EU look to the Arctic 
for petroleum supply to reduce dependence on a limited number of large suppliers. Many consider the 
Arctic to be the last large petroleum frontier outside the OPEC cartel (UNEP/GRID, 2006) and some 
even question OPEC’s ability to increase the oil and gas production as the cartel claims it is capable of 
(Salameh, 2004). Increased problems for operation by international private oil companies in some 
regions due to the recent resurge of resource nationalism might intensify their search for new oil and 
gas frontiers like the Arctic (Kretzschmar et al, 2010). However, petroleum production in the Arctic is 
facing harsh weather conditions and high costs compared with other producing petroleum provinces. 
The challenges will be even higher in the future, as production increasingly is expected to take place in 
offshore and more remote areas lacking infrastructure for transportation. Hence, the arctic supply can 
be highly sensitive to future development in petroleum prices.  
 
Arctic resources have been assessed by USGS (USGS, 2000; USGS, 2008) and Wood Mackenzie 
(2006). USGS (2000) outlined considerable prospects for supply of arctic oil and gas, whereas Wood 
Mackenzie questioned the perception of the Arctic as one of the last oil and gas frontiers. In 2008 the 
USGS carried out a Circumpolar Assessment of undiscovered Resources in the Arctic - CARA 
(USGS, 2008) - restating that the Arctic has resources to remain a major petroleum province in the 
future. The two studies differ somewhat in their approach, and neither study provides explicit 
assessments of economic viability associated with the estimated resource potential.  
 
This paper analyzes how future arctic oil and gas production might develop. Our study assumes a 
resource situation as depicted by USGS 2008 and seeks to answer the following questions: 
• How robust is arctic supply to future oil price development? 
• How will less than full access to arctic resources affect the supply of arctic oil and gas? 
 
To answer these questions we apply a comprehensive and transparent global oil and gas model with 
prices, costs and reserves. In our model oil and gas producers outside the OPEC cartel base their 
investment and production decisions on profit maximization and detailed information about the access 
to fields worldwide. The assumption that investments first target the most profitable reserves leads to a 
geographical spread of oil extraction worldwide. 
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The global demand for oil and gas increased considerably during the last decade as a response to rapid 
economic growth in population rich countries like China and India, raising the oil price considerably. 
Supply seemed to be unable to meet demand, facing capacity constraints in oil producing countries 
outside OPEC. As a result of the financial and economic crisis in 2008, the yearly average IEA crude 
import price (in USD, 2008-prices) fell from 97 USD per barrel in 2008 to 60 USD per barrel in 2009, 
before it increased to 77 USD in 2010. For the years to come, the International Energy Agency (IEA, 
2009) expects the real oil price to recover and rise to 100 USD by 2020 and 115 USD by 2030. This 
price forecast is slightly lower than in the reference scenario of EIA (2010a), but higher than the 
estimate made by OPEC. The OPEC World Oil Outlook (OPEC, 2009) sticks to previous assumptions 
that the nominal oil price will be in the range from 70 USD to 90 USD over the decade 2010-2020. 
 
These price expectations are the results of different assumptions regarding fundamental economic and 
political drivers of the demand and supply. It might be optimal for OPEC to keep the production level 
high to prevent the oil price from rising too fast either to discourage the more costly reserves outside 
OPEC from being developed or to prevent the oil industry from introducing new technologies. A low 
price scenario might also evolve if climate policies effectively reduce demand. The pledges made in 
the wake of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) of the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen in 2009 
to cut emissions made by large economies and emitters including emerging economies give some 
support to this view (UNFCCC, 2010). Irrespective of policy measures used, and degree of 
international cooperation, the user cost of consuming fossil energy is likely to increase and cause a 
decline in demand relative to a business as usual scenario. “Peak demand” and low producer prices 
might particularly affect high cost regions like the Arctic. In addition to the reference scenario, IEA 
therefore considers a moderate oil price scenario, complying with the policy of limiting the 
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere to 450 ppm and thus ensure that the increase in global mean 
temperature is limited to 2 °C (IEA, 2009). However, low ambitions in climate policy and continued 
high economic growth in large developing economies might sustain a high oil price. A constrained 
supply due to stricter regulation of offshore drilling to limit environmental hazards may also contribute 
to high petroleum prices. In addition, OPEC might find it optimal to limit production and let the oil 
price increase somewhat over time. As the IEA (2009) presents no high price scenario, we define our 
high price scenario by letting the oil price reach 140 USD (2008 prices) per boe in 20301.  
 
A recent development bringing price uncertainty into the petroleum market is the effect of rapidly 
growing supply of unconventional reserves like oil sands in Canada and shale gas in the US. These 
reserves are significant in the global context and are being developed with political support as a mean 
                                                     
1 The recently published World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2010) has a high oil price scenario marginally lower than ours. Their 
new reference and low price scenarios are similar to the scenarios in the 2009 report. 
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to reduce dependence on a limited number of large suppliers. Our model analyzes include both 
conventional and unconventional oil and gas reserves. 
2. Arctic petroleum resources 
How much of the world’s oil and gas resources has already been discovered and what is the potential 
for future discoveries? Proven reserves are defined as fully identified and economically viable 
resources. The USGS 2000 estimate of global undiscovered oil and gas resources is based on 
geological information and makes up around 90 per cent of what is defined as global proven reserves 
in BP (2010) 2. There is large uncertainty associated with resource estimates in the Arctic, where a 
substantial share of the resources are under the sea bed, and exploration drilling is costly.  
 
Over the last decade a few comprehensive assessments of undiscovered petroleum resources in the 
Arctic have been carried out with somewhat different results. Wood Mackenzie (2006) assessed the 
undiscovered reserves in the arctic regions and questioned the perception of the Arctic as one of the 
last great oil and gas frontiers (Oil & Gas Journal, 2006). The study concluded that total arctic 
undiscovered petroleum resources were only around 43 per cent of the estimates in USGS (2000). For 
oil, the study concluded that estimated undiscovered resources for North American Arctic and 
Greenland were only a quarter of earlier estimates made by USGS in 2000.  On the other hand, Wood 
Mackenzie raised the estimates for natural gas in the Arctic West Russia compared with the USGS 
2000 assessment.  The petroleum supply from the arctic region as a whole would, according to Wood 
Mackenzie, peak around 2030 at 8 million barrels of oil equivalents per day (boe/d) with 40 per cent 
oil and 60 per cent gas in the most likely scenarios, as a higher share of gas would mainly involve 
remote gas too expensive to transport to markets according to the Wood Mackenzie assessment. Wood 
Mackenzie concluded that the undiscovered resources are mainly located in either ice-free or seasonal 
ice-free areas, which require modifications of technology only – not new solutions. Subsea drilling is 
likely to be used for the greater share of the offshore resources.  
 
In 2008, the USGS completed their Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal (CARA), assessing the 
undiscovered petroleum resources north of the Arctic Circle in more detail (USGS, 2008). The study 
used a probability-geology based methodology covering sediments expected to have more than 10 per 
cent probability of having one or more significant oil or gas resources, i. e. fields containing more than 
50 mill boe. These resources were assumed to be recoverable without explicit economic 
considerations, however, implicitly the size of fields accounted for indicates economic viability. The 
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study did not consider the specific challenges associated with the ice cover and excluded resources 
where production would have to rely on technology that was not yet available. Around 80 per cent of 
the resources were found offshore, but relatively shallow under less than 500 meters of water (Gautier 
et al, 2009). Undiscovered petroleum resources were estimated by USGS (2008) to be 8.5 per cent 
higher than their 2000 estimate, leaving the Wood Mackenzie (2006) estimate at only around 40 per 
cent of the new USGS resource estimate. The 2008 assessment reduced oil resource estimates and 
increased gas resource estimates compared with the USGS 2000 assessment. Estimates of oil resources 
in Norway, Greenland and Russia were lowered and raised in Alaska and Canada. Gas resource 
estimates were lowered in Norway and increased in all the other regions. Still, after a 50 per cent 
downward adjustment, Greenland oil resources were estimated to 18 per cent of total arctic oil 
resources. Note, however, that the methods used in the USGS (2000) and USGS (2008) assessments 
differ, hence the results are not directly comparable. 
 
According to USGS (2008), the total amount of undiscovered petroleum resources in the Arctic is 413 
bboe, about 22 per cent of the global undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources. Further, they 
find that the Arctic contains 134 bboe of oil (incl. natural gas liquids, NGL) or about 15 per cent of 
total global oil resources. Hence 279 bboe or close to 70 per cent of the arctic petroleum is gas.  
 
Figure 1 shows that Arctic Russia dominates with 41 per cent of total arctic oil resources3. Second is 
Alaska with a lower share of 28 per cent. Greenland has 18 per cent, Arctic Canada 9 per cent and 
Arctic Norway 4 per cent.  While somewhat more than 80 per cent of the undiscovered oil resources in 
Arctic Canada are found offshore, a smaller share of 70 per cent of Arctic Russian resources is found 
off the coast. The figure for Alaska is around 50 per cent. Greenland and Arctic Norway have 
practically all of their undiscovered oil resources offshore and for the Arctic as a whole, as much as 
about 80 per cent of oil is located beneath the sea. 
 
For gas, Arctic Russia dominates even more with about 70 per cent of total arctic resources, whereas 
Alaska is second with 14 per cent (Figure 2). Notice that behind these numbers lies the assumption 
that Arctic Russia and Alaska are sharing equally the resources in the Chukchi Sea. This assumption 
does not affect the distribution much as the resources in the Chukchi Sea are not particularly large. For 
gas as for oil, Greenland has larger resources than Arctic Canada and Arctic Norway combined. The 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2 BP defines proven (or proved) reserves ”to be those quantities that geological and engineering information indicates with 
reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating 
conditions”. 
3 The different countries´ share of the arctic oil and gas resources is approximate, as certain resource basins belong to two, 
sometimes three, arctic states, without any clear distrinbution of the resources. 
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distribution between onshore and offshore resources in the Arctic is almost the same for gas as for oil, 
except that Arctic Russia stands out with as much as 90 per cent of the gas resources in offshore areas. 
Figure 1 Regional distribution of arctic undiscovered oil resources (including NGL) 
Total Arctic oil: 134 bboe (15 percent of global conventional resources)
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Figure 2 Regional distribution of arctic undiscovered natural gas resources (incl. NGL) 
Total Arctic gas: 279 bboe (30 percent of global conventional resources)
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The presence of large resources does not by itself tell us when the oil or gas will be discovered and 
come on stream, and to what extent. An example of time consuming arctic offshore development is the 
history of the giant Shtokman gas field in the Russian sector of the Barents Sea. The Shtokman 
reserves were registered in the late 1980s, but are still not developed. Recently, the announced 
investment start up in 2013 was further delayed until 2016 (Rigzone, 2010).  
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3. The global petroleum model FRISBEE 
Below we describe the FRISBEE model of the global energy markets (Aune et al, 2005) used for this 
study of arctic petroleum supply. The model is previously used for studies of impacts of petroleum 
industry restructuring (Aune et al, 2010) and globalization of natural gas markets and trade (Aune et 
al, 2009).  
 
For this modelling work we have benefited from access to the comprehensive IHS Energy field 
database4. The FRISBEE-model describes future supply and demand of oil and gas through elaborate 
modelling of oil and gas investments and production. The base year is 2000. It is a recursively 
dynamic partial equilibrium model accounting explicitly for discoveries, reserves, field development 
and production of oil and gas. The model is updated to harmonize the regional production profiles up 
to 2010. The emphasis is on petroleum markets, however, the global market for coal and regional 
markets for electricity are also modelled, although in less detail. Production generally takes place in 15 
regions and 4 field categories depending on location onshore/offshore, depth of offshore fields and 
size of resources. We focus on six arctic regions; Alaska, Arctic Canada, Arctic Norway, Greenland, 
East Arctic Russia and West Arctic Russia. For each arctic region, the model depicts only one field 
category. We do not distinguish between single fields within the field categories. 
 
For both oil and gas FRISBEE distinguishes between three field stages within each field category, i.e. 
fields in production, undeveloped fields and undiscovered fields. Supply from developed fields in the 
model is determined so that marginal operating costs equal producer prices net of gross taxes. 
Operating costs are increasing functions of production, but are generally low unless production is 
close to the fields’ production capacity; then they increase rapidly. The cost functions are calibrated 
based on data on production costs in different locations.  
 
Oil and gas companies may invest in new fields and in reserve extensions of developed fields. 
Investments decisions are driven by expected net present values (NPV), which are calculated for four 
field categories in each of the 13 Non-OPEC regions, and for the single field category in the 6 arctic 
regions (see Appendix 1). Expected NPV depends on expected prices (adaptive), a pre-specified 
required rate of return (set to 10 per cent in real terms), unit operating and capital costs, and net and 
gross tax rates. Unit capital costs are convex in the short term, and increase when the pool of 
undeveloped reserves declines (for new fields), and when the recovery rate rises (for reserve 
extension). The assumption that investments first target the most profitable reserves leads to a 
geographical spread of oil extraction worldwide. Reserve extensions through improved oil and gas 
                                                     
4 www.ihs.com 
10 
recovery (IOR) will modify the rate of decline in production after the peak level.  In the future, a 
growing share of petroleum production will come from smaller and offshore fields, likely to have 
higher decline rates (IEA 2008). Hence, steadily increasing investments in IOR are needed to keep up 
production recovery rates. A typical production profile is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 Typical production profile 
 
P1 P2 P3 P4 t 
Production 
IOR 
 
 
New oil and gas discoveries are modelled in a simpler way than investment in already discovered 
fields. The amount of discoveries generally depends on expected prices and expected undiscovered 
resources in each region available in USGS (2000), which for some non-arctic regions is updated to 
cover data unto 20065. The undiscovered oil and gas reserves for the Arctic are from USGS (2008). 
The expected unconventional oil and gas resources are updated with data from 2006 (NPC, 2007).  
 
For arctic regions there is one field category only, and the time lag from investment decision to 
maximum plateau production is generally 50-100 per cent longer than in comparable fields within the 
non-arctic regions of the corresponding arctic state. The initial operational and capital costs are based 
on the IHS database. Future costs are uncertain, but costs will probably increase as production moves 
from onshore to offshore areas, which also often contain smaller fields. As we cannot distinguish 
between onshore/offshore or field size for arctic regions, we assume increasing future costs. Capital 
and operational costs beyond 2010 in new Alaskan fields are assumed to be 50 per cent higher than 
average costs of existing fields in the database. For Norway, the cost of new arctic fields is set to 50 
per cent above the cost level of the most expensive Norwegian non-arctic field category. It is assumed 
that Arctic Canada has the same cost level as Arctic Norway. The cost level in West Arctic Russia is 
set to 50 per cent above existing average cost level for this region, whereas costs in East Arctic Russia 
                                                     
5 energy.cr.usgs.gov/oilgas/wep/assessment_updates.html 
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are doubled. Capital and operational costs in Greenland are set equal to that of East Arctic Russia. 
Investment costs are assumed to increase over time as the reserves are depleted. However, additional 
discoveries and technological change reduce the cost of developing new fields. 
 
The world market price of oil is exogenous in the model. OPEC satisfies the residual demand at the 
prevailing oil price, determined as the difference between world demand and Non-OPEC supply. The 
fixed oil price assumption implies that total demand and Non-OPEC supply including arctic regions 
are determined independently of each other. Non-OPEC supply is responding to the oil price level. If 
demand rises due to income growth, OPEC will increase supply to cover additional demand and keep 
the oil price at the preferred level of the cartel. In the gas markets, however, the price is endogenous 
because the markets are competitive. Below we describe the demand side for gas, and demand for oil 
is modelled similarly. 
 
Demand of gas is modelled in each region for the three industries manufacturing, electricity 
production and other sectors (including households and services).  Demand is driven by growth in 
GDP and population. Gas demand is a function of the end-user prices of all energy goods, with own 
price-elasticities for manufacturing and other sectors at an average of -0.3 for the long run and -0.1 in 
the short run (one year), and with low cross-price elasticities. In the long run, gas demand is 
particularly dependent on population and income growth with income elasticity of 0.6. Autonomous 
energy efficiency improvement in gas consumption is set to 0.25 per cent per year in OECD countries 
and 0.50 per cent for the rest of the world. 
 
The model output covers regional supply, demand and trade flows.  The version adopted here is 
specially designed to look at the role of arctic petroleum supply, which is represented by the six 
regions Alaska, Northern Canada, Greenland, Arctic Norway and Arctic Russia, with Arctic Russia 
further divided into West and East Russia. The East Russia region covers the petroleum provinces 
from the Sakha region and eastwards, i.e. from the Laptev Sea to the Russian part of the Chukchi Sea. 
The arctic regional petroleum activity is defined based on AMAP data (AMAP, 2007). Arctic regions 
are only modelled as producers of petroleum, whereas the demand generated by the small arctic 
population of 10 millions is counted together with demand from non-arctic regions of their 
corresponding arctic states. The regions and field categories are listed in the Appendix. 
 
The global oil and gas industry outside OPEC is modelled as separate investors allocating up to 50 
percent of the annual cash flow to field investments by maximizing net present value of returns, based 
on adaptive expectations of the future oil and gas price. The cash flow constraint is generally not 
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binding in our scenarios, i.e. the petroleum companies invest in all projects that give at least the 
required rate of return of  10 per cent. 
 
The gas price is endogenously determined in regional markets. The model depicts the gas market as 
global and integrated, as liberalization processes are taking place both in OECD and non-OECD 
regions, gradually reducing the market power of large, downstream companies. In addition, the extent 
of spot trade is growing fast, and gas price indexation is partially replacing the oil price link in long-
term contracts. One factor behind this development is the decline in costs of transportation, in 
particular for LNG.  
4. Oil price scenarios 
The supply of oil and gas from arctic regions is calculated for three price trajectories and in addition in 
a scenario where political, technical or environmental aspects limit the access to resources to 50 per 
cent below the USGS 2008 estimate. 
 
Figure 4 shows the chosen oil price scenarios. In our reference scenario (middle) we assume that the 
oil price will follow the trajectory of the IEA reference scenario presented in IEA (2009). It assumes 
that the price (in USD, 2008 prices) increases to 100 USD/boe by 2020, and further to 115 USD/boe in 
2030. We let the oil price stay constant at that level for the period  after 2030 as shown in Figure 4. A 
low price scenario has the oil price reaching 90 USD by 2016 staying constant thereafter. This price 
development corresponds to the price path of the IEA 2 °C scenario, which we extend to 2050, by 
keeping the oil price constant at the 2030 level until 2050. Note, however, that our low price scenario 
is no climate policy scenario and involves no taxes or regulations limiting production. We also depict 
a high price scenario with the oil price rising to 140 USD by 2030 and staying constant at that level 
until 2050.   
 
In the FRISBEE model, oil and gas investors respond with adaptive price expectations, assuming that 
the future petroleum price will settle at the average of the prices the 6 previous years. When the real 
price of oil is increasing, the adaptive expectations will lead investors into a rising expected price path 
that is lagging somewhat behind the real price development. This will also be true for gas, if the 
endogenous gas price is increasing.  
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Fig. 4 Oil price scenarios. USD (2008 prices)/boe 
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5. Results 
Before presenting the results, we emphasize that our production profiles are based on the assumption 
of profitability and of oil and gas companies having full access to all areas that contain petroleum, i.e. 
there are no political or environmental restrictions. 
5.1 Reference scenario 
Figure 5 shows that arctic oil production really took off in the mid-sixties  and continued to increase 
up to around 1988. The break-up of the Soviet Union led to a decline in oil production from then on, 
before it started to increase again in the late 1990s. Due to Russia’s dominant share in total arctic oil 
production, this was also reflected in aggregate production at circumpolar level. Our model 
simulations show that the IEA reference oil price trajectory will lead to a considerable rise in total 
arctic oil production from 2020 to 2050. After a stagnant period up to 2020 the supply will increase 
from around 400 mtoe to above 800 mtoe. It is above all the two regions Alaska and Greenland that 
generate the rising oil volumes towards the end of the period (Figure 6), and to a some extent Arctic 
Russia. Alaska’s oil supply takes off from around 2015 after 20 years of decline as the giant field of 
Prudhoe Bay is being emptied. Greenland’s resources come on stream from 2025, but do not take off 
before around 2030, rising to a level of production twice the level of Alaska when Prudhoe Bay 
peaked in the 1990s. Canada remains a minor producer of oil, showing a steeply rising but rapidly 
peaking production around 2025. From around 2030, Arctic Russia increases the volumes 
considerably, but reaches a new turning point towards the end of the time horizon.  
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Figure 5 Arctic oil production. Reference scenario. Mtoe. 
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Figure 6 Regional distribution of West Arctic oil production. Reference scenario. Mtoe. 
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It is important to notice that behind these production profiles many fields are emptied and new already 
proven fields are developed. As will be shown later, resources in currently undiscovered fields are 
only to a minor extent developed before 2030, partly due to long lead times. For Russia, practically all 
production before 2030 comes from their large proven reserves, both developed and undeveloped. 
Arctic Russian oil production today is situated onshore in the West Arctic regions of Yamal-Nenets, 
Khanty-Mansi and Komi. A large part of the proven oil reserves is also found in these onshore 
regions, although some are situated offshore, e.g. the Prirazlomnoye oil field at only 20 meters depth 
in the Pechora Sea. Even if the launch of this oil field has been postponed several times, Gazprom 
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states that production will start in 2011-12 (Barents Observer, 2010). Production from their large but 
currently undiscovered oil resources (cf. Figure 1) are gradually phased in, leading to an increase in oil 
production after 2030. The higher cost reserves in East Arctic Russia are gradually becoming 
profitable to extract, and this region’s share of oil production in total Arctic Russia increases from 3 
percent today to 11 per cent in 2050. 
 
It is however, important to be aware of the simplification we make in assuming that national oil and 
gas companies like the Russian apply the same investment rule of profit-maximization as private 
international petroleum companies. In general, social and political priorities are perceived to have a 
stronger hand on the national oil and gas companies, although national companies over time have 
approached commercial behaviour. Russia (and other circumpolar nations) might find it convenient to 
collaborate with international petroleum companies with the necessary technological expertise and 
experience regarding offshore extraction. However, Russian engineers are world leaders in inland 
arctic pipeline technology as in the West Siberia and Yamal Peninsula (Stern, 2009). 
 
Alaskan oil production today is mainly taking place on the North Slope, which covers the Central 
Arctic state lands and adjacent waters of the Beaufort Sea. Production peaked in 1988, producing around 
25 per cent of US domestic supply. Production later declined and represents today around 12 per cent of 
the US domestic production level. Notice that as much as 28 per cent of the total arctic undiscovered oil 
resources are found in Alaska (cf. Figure 1). Substantial future increase in Alaskan oil production 
depends on the opening of all offshore areas from the Chukchi Sea Outer Continental Shelf in the west to 
the Canadian border in the east. Further, it requires that all onshore areas including the area of the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska are accessible. Over 
time, investment in new discoveries contributes to the rapidly rising production. Some may question this 
rise, however, EIA (2008) estimates a high-resource case production level only for the ANWR in 2028, 
which is 10 per cent lower than our production level. Some of the difference may be because our study 
covers all Alaskan areas and because we also assume full access to these areas at all points in time. 
 
Even if Canada is a large petroleum producer, only a small share of their activities has been located in 
the Arctic (AMAP, 2007). Oil and gas production has taken place in the Mackenzie Delta/Beafort Sea 
Basin and on the Arctic Archipelago. Relatively large oil resources are expected to be found in the 
western areas towards Alaska as well as the eastern waters towards Greenland. The steep increase in 
production depicted by our reference scenario is dependent on shorter approval times than Canada often 
experience today and better infrastructure in terms of roads, ports and tanker facilities (see EIA, 2010b). 
As a relatively small share of the undiscovered oil resources are situated in Arctic Canada, production 
from new discoveries starts to decline in the late 2020s until it levels out from around 2040. 
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Arctic Norwegian oil production includes the fields in the Norwegian Sea, where production on the 
Draugen field started as early as in 1993. There has been no oil production further north, but 
production from the Goliat field in the Barents Sea is expected to start in 2013 (Reuters, 2010). New 
discoveries are expected in Lofoten/Vesterålen, which is yet closed to oil and gas production, and in 
the Barents Sea. The latter area recently increased its importance for the petroleum companies as the 
dispute over the dividing line between Russia and Norway was resolved. Like Canada, Norway has a 
relatively small share of the undiscovered oil resources in the Arctic. Production from these new 
discoveries is gradually phased in, keeping the total Arctic Norwegian oil production level more or 
less constant around the 2010 level. 
 
So far there has been no petroleum production in Greenland, but in 2010 both oil and gas were found 
in the waters between Canada and Greenland (Guardian, 2010). No reserves have yet been proven, 
however, as much as 18 per cent of the total arctic oil resources are expected to be found in Greenland 
according to USGS (2008). Greenland has the highest capital and operational costs in the Arctic 
(similar to East Arctic Russia). It seems reasonable that it might take a couple of decades before the 
production in this challenging region can start. Production from their large amount of currently 
undiscovered oil resources (cf. Figure 1) are gradually phased in, leading to a rapid  increase in oil 
production after 2030. However, one might question if the steep rise in volume according to our 
results is really feasible. Considering the historic development in arctic oil production (Figure 5), 
Arctic Russia managed to increase onshore output with almost 400 mtoe over a similar time frame at 
the very beginning of the Arctic Russian oil era. The capacity of the petroleum industry to overcome 
the offshore and ice challenges might modify the rapid entry of Greenland reserves, though. 
 
From Table 1 we see that the arctic share of Non-OPEC supply of conventional oil is clearly increasing, 
and so is the arctic share of total Non-OPEC supply when including unconventional oil, but less 
markedly. Hence, in our reference scenario the Arctic clearly increases its importance as oil supplier 
outside OPEC. In relation to world oil supply the Arctic slightly reduces its share from 10 per cent to 8 
per cent in 2050. The reason for this is that OPEC is a residual supplier and increases production to make 
the oil price follow the given path of the reference scenario presumingly reflecting the preferences of the 
cartel. The high share of arctic supply in conventional oil represents an advantage as unconventional 
reserves are considerably more vulnerable to climate and environmental policies. 
Table 1. Arctic oil production in relation to Non-OPEC and global supply. Reference  
scenario. Per cent 
 2010 2050
Arctic share of Non-OPEC conventional oil 16 31
Arctic share of total Non-OPEC 16 22
Arctic share of world oil production 10 8
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Figure 7 Arctic oil production in relation to Non-OPEC and global supply. Reference  
scenario. Mtoe 
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From Figure 7 we see that total Non-OPEC conventional oil is rising initially but peaks around 2025, 
entering a somewhat lower and slowly declining level. Non-OPEC unconventional oil is filling in, 
ensuring a continued growth in Non-OPEC total oil supply until around 2045. However, the  increase 
in unconventional oil supply is far from enough to keep up with the steeply rising trend in global oil 
demand, and the world will have to rely even more on OPEC in the future along the reference 
scenario. The arctic oil supply continues to increase towards the end of the period due to production 
increase in Alaska and Greenland. 
 
The IEA reference scenario covers the period 2008-2030. As our reference price scenario and the IEA 
2 °C price path are equal until 2030, it is possible to compare the results for oil production in this 
period. Our world oil output is around 20 per cent higher than IEA in 2030. The main reason is higher 
Non-OPEC supply (incl. unconventional) but also higher OPEC output. 
 
The model results show that the future gas price differs somewhat between the regions, albeit less than 
today. The world average natural gas price is around 0.23 USD (2008 prices)/Sm3 in 2050, around 35 
per cent higher than in 2010. Figure 8 shows total arctic natural gas production. Similar to oil, gas 
production increased from the mid-sixties to around 1990. Production in the beginning of the 2000s is 
marginally higher than the record levels reached during 1990-1992. As much as 70 per cent of the total 
arctic undiscovered gas reserves are found in Arctic Russia. The total arctic supply of gas will decline 
until about 2035-2040, due to a marked reduction in Russian volumes. When production rises again 
after 2040 it is partly due to a Russian comeback, but primarily a result of marked increases in gas 
supply from the other arctic regions, although from generally low levels (see Figure 9).  
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Figure 8 Arctic gas production. Reference scenario. Mtoe. 
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Almost all of the Arctic Russian gas production currently takes place onshore in the region of Yamal-
Nenets. Our model projections show that Arctic Russian production in 2020 will be around 85 per cent 
of the level in 2004. Such a decline may seem dramatic. Stern (2005) finds that total Russian output6 
from existing fields in operation in 2020 will be 63 per cent of the level in 2004. However, Stern does 
not take into account production from proven, but undeveloped reserves and consequently he projects 
a steeper decline than found in our projection. Stern (2009) points out that the Russian gas industry for 
the past several decades has been sustained by three supergiant fields, all of which were in decline by 
the early 2000s. During the period 2001-2008 Gazprom developed one supergiant field and a number 
of smaller satellite fields, which enabled the production to stabilize during 2000-2010. In addition, due 
to the financial crisis and reduced demand for Russian gas the last couple of years, the development 
e.g. of the new giant Bovanenko gas field on the Yamal Peninsula has been postponed to start up in 
2012, at the earliest. Our results show that Russia increases its investments in new reserves, sufficient 
to increase gas volumes from the late 2030s. Increased gas production takes place almost only in West 
Arctic Russia as this region has the major part of the undiscovered reserves as well as lower capital 
and operational costs than East Arctic Russia7. 
 
In Alaska, a large part of the gas supply is not delivered to customers, but is used for e.g. 
repressurization in the oil production. Even if Alaska has around 14 per cent of total arctic 
undiscovered gas resources (Figure 2), these resources will only gradually be developed, leading to 
                                                     
6 In 2004 the Arctic share of total Russian gas output was around 90 per cent. 
7 The eastern part increases its share of Arctic Russian gas production from 0.4 to 1.2 per cent. 
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stagnant production until gas supply increases from around 2035 (Figure 9). This is likely to be 
conditioned by the construction of an Alaskan North Slope natural gas pipeline, similar to the existing 
pipeline pumping oil to the southern warm-water Alaskan port of Valdez. Likewise, the surge in 
Canadian Arctic gas production is clearly dependent on the building of the Mackenzie Valley gas 
pipeline, bringing arctic gas from the Mackenzie delta to the markets in Alberta and beyond. This 
project has been postponed several times, partly due to falling demand and gas prices in the US, but 
also due to aboriginal land claims and land access issues (Parliamentary Infoseries, 2008). The latter 
issue was recently accentuated as the aboriginals managed to stop seismic operations in the Baffin 
Bay, as the self-government agreement demands that the aboriginals are consulted prior to these kind 
of activities (Winnipeg Free Press, 2010).  
Figure 9 Regional distribution of West Arctic gas production. Reference scenario. Mtoe 
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In Arctic Norway, there is currently gas production in the Norwegian Sea, and in one field in the 
Barents Sea (Snøhvit). The Snøhvit gas field was proven in the late 1980s, and started producing in 
2007. Production from the currently undiscovered gas resources (cf. Figure 2) are gradually phased in, 
leading to somewhat more than a doubling of the Arctic Norwegian production level over the 40 year 
period. No Greenland gas reserves have yet been proven, however, as much as 8 per cent of the total 
Arctic gas resources are expected to be found there. With relatively high capital and operational costs, 
it seems reasonable with a lag of two decades before the production in this challenging region can 
start. Production increases as from around 2035, reaching about the same level of the other West 
Arctic regions in 2050. 
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The gas production in Greenland and Alaska is around 15 per cent of their respective oil production 
levels in 2050, measured in mtoe. The Canadian and Norwegian gas supply is around 15 and 40 per 
cent higher, respectively, than their corresponding oil output in 2050. 
 
As Table 2 shows, the arctic share of total gas production outside the Middle Eastern/North-African 
(MENA) region falls somewhat. Compared with global gas supply the relative importance of the 
Arctic is halved over the period. The reason is abundant and cheap gas resources from the MENA 
region, above all Iran and Qatar. Towards 2050 the MENA region has a market share of above 50 per 
cent. However, gas production in other regions increases faster towards the end of the projection 
period.  
Table 2 Arctic gas in relation to MENA and global supply8. Reference scenario. Per cent 
 2010 2050
Arctic share of total production outside Middle East/North-Africa (MENA) 27 22
Arctic share of world gas production 22 10
Figure 10 Arctic gas production in relation to MENA and global gas supply. Reference sce-
nario. Mtoe 
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In our reference scenario the arctic supply of oil in 2030 surpasses the reference level of Wood  
Mackenzie with about 100 per cent. However, we apply different price assumptions. In a previous 
study based on FRISBEE we found that with an oil price of 40 USD (2008 prices)/boe the arctic oil 
production estimate is only marginally higher than that of Wood Mackenzie. We have no information 
on which oil prices Wood Mackenzie applied in their study; during the time of their study the oil price 
was around 50-60 USD/boe and generally few studies assumed as high future oil prices as in IEA 
                                                     
8 Production from both unconventional and conventional gas reserves. 
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(2009). Hence, our model results may actually not deviate much from the Wood Mackenzie study if 
we adjust for different oil price assumptions. In addition, we apply larger undiscovered resources in 
line with the USGS estimate from 2008, but only a relatively small amount of these resources 
materialize into production before 2030 and cannot explain the difference. 
 
Our estimate of arctic production level of gas in 2030 is around 50 per cent higher than Wood 
Mackenzie. However, Wood Mackenzie also depicts a more optimistic scenario for future production 
where gas supply will peak at almost 10 mboe/day in 2030. This is actually 20 per cent higher than our 
gas supply level for this year.  
5.2 Low price scenario  
Figures 11-12 show the development of arctic oil supply if the oil price follows the 2 °C price scenario 
of IEA. Total arctic oil production in 2050 turns out to be 20 per cent lower than in the reference 
scenario. In relative terms Russia is cutting production the most (24 per cent), followed by Greenland 
(21 per cent) and Alaska (17 per cent). Russia will not contribute to a rise in arctic oil production after 
2030 and ends up below today’s level in 2050. Arctic Norway reduces production until 2030-35, but 
achieves a higher output in 2050 in the low price scenario than in the reference scenario. The reason is 
that with a lower future oil price the extraction is lower from around 2020 to 2045. This leaves more 
oil in the reservoirs and thus delays the increase in cost of developing new reserves towards the end of 
the time horizon. 
Figure 11 Arctic oil production. Reference and low oil price scenarios. Mtoe. 
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Figure 12 Regional distribution of West Arctic oil production. Reference and low oil price sce-
narios. Mtoe 
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Table 3 shows the deviation from the reference scenario in terms of accumulated output of oil 2010-
2050 by arctic region. Compared with the reference scenario, Greenland will make the largest cut in 
relative terms of their extraction, and ends up 37 per cent below the reference scenario by 2050. The 
reason is that Greenland is hit harder by a reduction in the oil price, as they produce practically all 
their oil after 2030, when the oil price is at its highest level in the reference scenario. This is also the 
reason why Alaska is hit to a higher degree (14 per cent) than Canada (10 per cent), while Norway and 
Russia lies in between (12 per cent). 
Table 3 Accumulated oil production 2010-2050. Low price (2 degrees) scenario. Deviation 
from reference scenario. Per cent 
Total Arctic Greenland Russia Canada Alaska Norway
-14 -37 -12 -10 -14 -12
 
In the reference scenario the arctic regions increase their share of oil production outside OPEC, and 
their share of global oil production is only somewhat reduced. In the low price scenario, the Arctic 
loses some of its relative importance and the arctic share of global oil production is reduced to only 7 
per cent compared with 10 per cent in the reference scenario. As the arctic oil is generally more costly 
to produce (and with higher lead times) than Non-OPEC oil in temperate regions, the Arctic will suffer 
more from an oil price reduction, as expected. In our model, OPEC is the residual supplier and simply 
delivers the amount of oil that is necessary to keep the oil price at the given price trajectory. This 
would lead to a doubling of the cartel’s production over the period, which might seem unrealistic. 
However, the low oil price scenario could have been reached with a tax that would reduce global 
demand as well as OPEC production. 
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Table 4. Arctic oil production in relation to Non-OPEC and global supply. Reference and low 
price scenarios. Per cent 
 2010 Reference 
scenario 2050 
Low oil price 
scenario 2050
Arctic share of Non-OPEC conventional oil 16 32 28
Arctic share of total Non-OPEC 16 22 20
Arctic share of world oil production 10 8 7
Figure 13 Arctic oil production in relation to Non-OPEC and global supply. Low oil price sce-
nario. Mtoe 
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We also see from Figure 13 that while total Non-OPEC output peaks towards the end of the period, 
arctic oil production is still on an increasing trend due to Greenland and Alaska. 
 
Arctic oil production in FRISBEE reaches a level of 8.4 mboe/day in 2030 in the low oil price 
scenario of 90 USD/boe. In addition to their reference level of 3.2 mboe/day, Wood Mackenzie depicts 
what they call a more optimistic scenario for future production where oil supply will peak at 4.6 
mboe/day in 2030.  To match this level of oil production, FRISBEE would have to assume a constant 
low oil price of about 50 USD (2008 prices)/boe. 
 
In our model oil and gas companies operate as separate industries and investment decisions are not 
influenced by each other. Hence, less profitable investment opportunities in the gas market will not 
affect the oil market and vice versa. Due to relatively small substitution possibilities on the demand 
side between oil and gas, the arctic gas production scenario with a lower oil price is practically 
identical to the reference oil price scenario. 
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5.3 High price scenario 
In this scenario the oil price reaches 140 USD by 2030 and stays at this level to 2050. Total arctic oil 
production reaches a level in 2050 which is 12 per cent above the reference scenario (Figure 14). Russian 
deliveries are 18 per cent above reference level by the end of the period, but show a more marked 
tendency to peak before 2050 than in the reference scenario. As the oil price is higher in this scenario, 
production is also higher from around 2025 as expected, but the development costs rise faster as reserves 
are being depleted and creates the more distinct peak formation. Alaska produces 13 per cent more at the 
end of the horizon, Canada 11 per cent and Greenland only 3 per cent above the reference level in 2050. 
Figure 14. Arctic oil production. Reference and high oil price scenarios. Mtoe 
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Figure 15. Regional distribution of West Arctic oil production. Reference and high oil price 
scenarios. Mtoe 
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Table 5 shows the impact of the higher price in terms of accumulated oil production by region. In 
total, arctic regions will produce 11 per cent more in the high price scenario than in the reference 
scenario. Greenland responds strongly to the high price by increasing accumulated production by as 
much as 26 per cent, whereas the other regions increase oil production in the range of 7-11 per cent. 
East Arctic Russia extracts 15 per cent more. Greenland and East Arctic Russia responds more 
strongly in cumulative terms because all their production takes place at the end of the period when the 
price difference to the reference scenario is largest. In addition, these two regions have the highest 
costs and benefit relatively more from an increase in the oil price. Note, however, that such a 
development requires that the oil and gas companies will get full access to the reserves in the Arctic 
and that no environmental and political constraints are binding.  
Table 5 Accumulated oil production 2010-2050. High price scenario. Deviation from refer-
ence scenario. Per cent 
Total Arctic Greenland Russia Canada Alaska Norway
11 26 10 7 11 9
Table 6 Arctic oil in relation to Non-OPEC, and global supply. Reference and high oil price 
scenarios. Per cent 
 2010 Reference 
scenario 2050 
High oil price 
scenario 2050
Arctic share of Non-OPEC conventional oil 16 32 31
Arctic share of total Non-OPEC 16 22 23
Arctic share of world oil production 10 8 16
Figure 16 Arctic oil production in relation to Non-OPEC and global supply. High oil price 
scenario. Mtoe 
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In the high price scenario the Arctic roughly maintains the position it had in the reference scenario in 
relation to other Non-OPEC producers of conventional oil and also among all Non-OPEC producers 
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including unconventional oil. The Arctic clearly takes a higher share in global oil markets by 2050, 
increasing from 8 to 16 per cent of global output. This is a result of OPEC behaving like a cartel by 
regulating the production to sustain the price level in line with IEA assumptions. We can conclude that 
the potential for increasing output with a higher oil price is as high in the Arctic as in more temperate 
Non-OPEC regions. Figure 16 illustrates the path of oil supply from the different producer groups. We 
also see that arctic oil supply peaks some years later than total Non-OPEC. The gas market is again 
relatively little affected by an oil price increase, as was discussed earlier. 
5.4  A 50 per cent reduction in undiscovered resources 
The estimate of undiscovered resources in the Arctic is uncertain, but the West Arctic regions have 
some institutional benefits that are important to the private international oil companies. In these 
regions the oil companies can buy licenses and get access to the petroleum reserves and associated 
petroleum rent. Globally, this opportunity has diminished as the state owned national oil companies 
(NOC) now control the majority of the petroleum reserves. There is, however, uncertainty to what 
extent future production in Russia will be based on profitability and international access to reserves. 
Figure 17 Arctic oil production. Reference and low resource scenarios. Mto 
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In addition, many regions experience concerns about possible environmental hazards with petroleum 
drilling and transportation in arctic cold waters. To simulate such a possible scenario with 
environmental or political constraints, we reduce the amount of arctic undiscovered resources that the 
petroleum companies get access to by 50 per cent. 
 
If undiscovered resources are expected to be only half of the USGS 2008 estimate, the Arctic will 
practically not provide rising oil volumes before 2030, when production climbs until it peaks around 
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2045 at a level somewhat above the peak level of the late 1980s. In 2050 the output is 33 per cent 
below the reference scenario. Only about 25 per cent of the reduction can be traced to Arctic Russia, 
with peaking supply around 2040 at about the 2010 output level. Even if these low resource estimates 
are more in line with Wood Mackenzie, our production level in 2030 is still much higher. The reason 
is that our production projection has hardly changed prior to 2030 due to lower undiscovered 
resources. Table 7 shows the reduction in accumulated supply by region over the whole time horizon.  
Figure 18 Regional distribution of West Arctic oil production. Reference and low resource 
scenarios. Mtoe 
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Table 7 Accumulated oil production 2010-2050. Low resource scenario. Deviation from ref-
erence scenario. Per cent 
Total Arctic Greenland Russia Canada Alaska Norway
-15 -33 -6 -38 -33 -33
 
The reduction in Arctic Russia is moderate because the region has considerable discovered reserves 
that support production for most of the time horizon and the effects on production of reduced 
undiscovered resources would largely come beyond 2050. This is the reason why West Arctic Russia 
loses only 5 per cent of their accumulated oil production. However, we emphasize that East Arctic 
Russia is hit more as they lose around 20 per cent of their production, because a larger share of their 
production is dependent on undiscovered resources. The cut in production is generally around 33-37 
per cent in the other regions than Arctic Russia as more of their oil come from the undiscovered 
resources before 2050.  
 
To indicate the importance of new discoveries for the West Arctic regions, we have done a simulation 
of future supply for Alaska including only already discovered reserves, i.e. we assume that no new oil 
resources will be found and developed. Then Alaskan production will reach 17 mtoe in 2050, less than 
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10 per cent of the level in our reference scenario with full access to new discoveries. DOE/NETL 
(2009) projects the Alaskan production from already discovered fields in 2050 to be only around half 
of our no discovery level. However, contrary to our simulation DOE/NETL does not take into account 
reserve extensions through increased oil recovery from discovered fields over the period. 
 
Figure 19 shows the effects of reduced arctic gas reserves on supply. Towards the end of the time 
period and after a long and steep decline, arctic gas supply is on the rise showing no sign of immediate 
peak, even though the undiscovered resources have been reduced considerably. We see that Arctic 
Russia and, hence, total Arctic is only to a small extent affected by a reduction in undiscovered 
resources. The reason is the same as for oil, but now even more important, that the vast majority of gas 
production in Russia before 2050 is from proven and already discovered reserves. As opposed to oil, 
the effect now holds for both the East and the West Arctic Russian regions. Even though gas 
production of the West Arctic regions is hit more, the effect is much lower than for oil. We see from 
Table 9 that the share of arctic gas in a global context is practically unchanged. 
Figure 19 Arctic gas production. Reference and low resource scenarios. Mtoe 
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Even if the production level is lower in 2050 than today, one might wonder if the size of future Arctic 
Russian oil and gas output from proven, but undeveloped reserves is really feasible. The Arctic 
Russian oil and gas production currently takes place onshore and the Russians have long experience 
with this type of activities (Stern, 2009). We emphasize that significant discoveries of oil and gas have 
also been made offshore in the Barents and the Kara Seas, like the Shtokman deepwater gas and 
condensate field and the shallow water Prirazlomnoye oil field (Yenikeyeff and Krysiek, 2007). 
However, when it comes to proven reserves, Stern (2009) points out that even if the Shtokman gas 
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field is a very large project, it is not matching the scale of the onshore Yamal Peninsula production9. 
Large proven onshore gas reserves and the fact that Russian engineers are world leaders in inland 
arctic pipeline technology support our result that almost all gas production before 2050 comes from 
already discovered resources. It is mainly beyond 2050 that extraction from new discoveries of 
offshore gas resources will play a part. Offshore extraction is more costly and demanding than onshore 
production and is also dependent on different technological expertise and experience. 
Figure 20 Regional distribution of arctic gas production. Reference and low resource scenar-
ios. Mtoe 
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Table 8 Accumulated gas production 2010-2050. Low resource scenario. Deviation from 
reference scenario. Per cent 
Total Arctic Greenland Russia Canada Alaska Norway
-4 -18 -2 -26 -15 -18
Table 9 Arctic gas in relation to MENA and global production. Reference and low resource 
scenarios. Per cent 
 2010 Reference 
scenario 2050 
Low resource 
scenario 2050
Arctic share of total production outside 
Middle East/North-Africa  27 22 20
Arctic share of world gas production 22 10 9
 
                                                     
9 While the first stage of the Shtokman field will bring 23.7 Bcm/year, with subsequent phases bringing production up to 
possible 95 Bcm/year, the first phase of the onshore Bovanenko field will bring 115 Bcm/year (Stern, 2009). 
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Concluding remarks 
We have examined how different petroleum prices and petroleum resource endowments influence 
future investment and production in the arctic regions up to 2050. In our reference scenario the arctic 
oil production doubles over the next 40 years. The reason is above all increased production in 
Greenland and Alaska, and to some extent Arctic Russia. In our reference scenario arctic gas 
production declines towards 2030 before it recovers to a level marginally lower than the present one 
by 2050. The decline in arctic gas supply during the first two decades is mainly related to lower gas 
production in Arctic Russia, whereas the later increase is due to higher production in all arctic regions, 
primarily in Arctic Russia and Greenland and to some extent in Arctic Canada. These results are based 
on assumption of profitability and of oil and gas companies having full access to all arctic areas that 
contain petroleum, i.e. there are no political or environmental restrictions. 
 
In our low oil price scenario the production in arctic regions is reduced to the same extent in relative 
terms, except for Greenland (and East Arctic Russia) that is hit more because the major part of their 
production takes place from 2030 to 2050, when the oil price of the reference scenario is at its highest 
level. In addition, East Arctic Russia and Greenland have the highest costs and lose relatively more 
than other arctic regions from a decline in the oil price. The same mechanism works with an oil price 
increase as in the high price scenarios, but in the opposite direction. 
 
When the oil and gas companies only get access to half of the undiscovered resources compared to the 
reference scenario, all arctic regions except Russia are hit relatively hard within our time frame. The 
reason is that a major part of Russian oil and gas production before 2050 comes from proven reserves 
and not from undiscovered resources. Because Arctic Russia is a dominant petroleum producer in the 
Arctic, access to less undiscovered oil resources will only have limited effect on total arctic oil 
production and only a marginal effect on arctic gas extraction. However, for the individual arctic 
region other than Russia, limited access to resources will clearly affect future income from oil and gas 
before 2050. 
 
Today, the Arctic is much more important as a gas supplier than as an oil producer for the global 
energy demand. However, even though 70 per cent of the undiscovered arctic petroleum resources are 
natural gas, the arctic share of world production declines to 2050, even with full access to 
undiscovered resources. The reason is cheap and abundant reserves in other regions, above all Qatar 
and Iran. Arctic oil will increase its importance as a Non-OPEC supplier to 2050. Its importance as a 
global oil producer may be maintained, if the oil price stays relatively high and the producers get 
access to a major part of the undiscovered arctic oil resources, above all in Alaska and Greenland. 
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Appendix: List of region and field categories in the FRISBEE model 
Table A1. List of oil regions and field categories in the FRISBEE model 
Oil field category 
 
1 2 3 4 
Africa Onshore  
Offshore deep 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore shallow 
 
Canada Arctic  
Non-Arctic conv. 
 
Unconventional   
Open Pit 
Unconventional   In 
Situ 
Caspian region Onshore < 400 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
> 400 Mboe 
China Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
>100; < 1000 Mboe
Onshore 
> 1000 Mboe 
Offshore 
Eastern Europe Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore 
< 100 Mboe 
Offshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Greenland All    
Latin America Onshore  
Offshore deep 
< 1000 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 1000 Mboe 
Offshore shallow 
Norway 
Arctic Non-Arctic Offshore 
deep 
Non-Arctic Offshore 
shallow  
< 100 Mboe 
Non-Arctic 
Offshore shallow 
> 100 Mboe 
OECD Pacific Onshore  
Offshore deep Offshore shallow 
< 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow 
> 100 Mboe 
OPEC Core Onshore         < 400 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400; < 1000 Mboe
Onshore 
> 1000 Mboe 
Offshore 
 
Rest of Asia Onshore < 400 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
> 400 Mboe 
OPEC Rest Onshore < 400 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
 
Offshore shallow 
Russia/Ukraine/
Belarus 
Non-Arctic 
Onshore 
Non-Arctic Offshore East Arctic West Arctic 
USA Non-Arctic Onshore 
Alaska 
 
Non-Arctic Offshore 
deep 
Non-Arctic 
Offshore shallow 
Western Europe 
Offshore deep 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore shallow + 
Onshore 
< 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow 
> 100 Mboe 
United Kingdom Offshore deep < 400 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore shallow 
< 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow 
> 100 Mboe 
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Table A2. List of gas regions and field categories in the FRISBEE model 
Gas10 field category 
 
1 2 3 4 
Africa Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow     Offshore deep     
Canada Arctic           Non-Arctic Onshore Non-Arctic Offshore shallow  
Non-Arctic 
Offshore deep 
Caspian region Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow     Offshore deep    
China Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow     Offshore deep    
Eastern Europe Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow     Offshore deep     
Greenland All    
Latin America Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow     Offshore deep    
Norway Arctic Non-Arctic Onshore Non-Arctic Offshore shallow   
Non-Arctic 
Offshore deep    
OECD Pacific Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow     Offshore deep     
OPEC Core Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore            Venezuela         
Rest of Asia Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow     Offshore deep     
OPEC Rest Nigeria  
Onshore            Offshore            Angola            
Russia/Ukraine/
Belarus 
Non-Arctic 
Onshore         
Non-Arctic Offshore  East Arctic Russia  West Arctic Russia 
USA Non-Arctic Onshore 
Alaska             Non-Arctic Offshore 
shallow       
Non-Arctic 
Offshore deep     
Western Europe Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow     Offshore deep     
United Kingdom Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow     Offshore deep     
 
                                                     
10 Conventional and unconventional. 
